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When people make important decisions, such as determining the
guilt or innocence of a defendant, it is desirable to have multiple
sources of information. For example, jurors in criminal cases and au-
ditors determining the likelihood of fraud both make critical decisions
and will want to have as much information about their case as possible.
However, much research has shown that using more than one source of
evidence results in biased judgments of the combined evidence, espe-
cially when one of the sources of evidence is non-diagnostic. With non-
diagnostic evidence people show a dilution effect: despite its irrelevance,
inclusion of non-diagnostic evidence tends to weaken or dilute diag-
nostic evidence. For example, in an experiment one group of mock
jurors were asked if a man had murdered his aunt, and were told the
diagnostic information that he was known to have argued with his aunt
and had no alibi. A second group were asked the same question, and
were told the same diagnostic information, but were additionally told
the nondiagnostic information that he was of average height and had
average vision. This second group were less confident that the man was
guilty of murder: the non-diagnostic information had diluted the di-
agnostic information Zukier and Jennings (1984).
The dilution effect has been found in many different tasks, including
tasks with objective probabilities that ask participants to reason about
the likelihood that a set of poker chips were drawn from one of two
book bags Labella and Koehler (2004), Shanteau (1975), Troutman and
Shanteau (1977), tasks that ask for predictions about the behavior of
people Nisbett et al. (1981), Zukier (1982), tasks asking for consumers’
judgments of products Meyvis and Janiszewski (2002), and even per-
ceptual tasks Hotaling et al. (2015), Yurovsky et al. (2013). High-stakes
judgments are not immune to the dilution effect. The dilution effect is
exacerbated by participants being held accountable Tetlock and
Boettger (1989), Tetlock et al. (1996), the dilution effect has been
found in hypothetical judgments of guilt by mock jurors Zukier and
Jennings (1984), and professional auditors show the dilution effect
when judging the likelihood of fraud both in the laboratory
Hackenbrack (1992) and in their professional judgments Waller and
Zimbelman (2003).
The dilution effect is also not an isolated cognitive bias – it has
similarities to other known judgment biases. One well-known and
related bias is the conjunction fallacy, in which participants judge the
probability of one statement to be less than the probability of the
conjunction of this same statement with another statement Tversky and
Kahneman (1983). Following the example above, a conjunction fallacy
would be judging the probability that a man had murdered his aunt and
was of average height to be greater than the probability that a man had
murdered his aunt – as the first statement is more restrictive, according
to the laws of probability it cannot also be more probable. The con-
junction fallacy task can require participants to judge situations that are
very similar to those in our dilution effect example, but it differs in the
type of judgment participants are asked to make.
Another related bias is the latent scope bias, which occurs when
people judge a “narrow-scope” explanation, that is one with fewer
unverified predictions, as more likely than a “broad-scope” explanation,
even in experiments in which the diagnostic evidence is missing
Khemlani et al. (2011). As an example of the latent scope bias, you
might be asked whether a man had murdered his aunt or not, and told
that if he had murdered his aunt there would be shell casings on the
floor and his customary mug of hot chocolate would have been left on
the table (broad scope), but if the second suspect had done it there
would only be shell casings (narrow scope). In this question the shell
casings are non-diagnostic as they do not discriminate between the
suspects, and the mug of hot chocolate is diagnostic because they do.
Despite not knowing whether the diagnostic mug of hot chocolate is
present, people tend to think the second suspect (narrow scope) is more
likely. This bias is related to the dilution effect in that it compares
explanations with diagnostic and non-diagnostic evidence, though both
the setup and the question asked of participants is different.
These related cognitive biases share many of the same explanations,
explanations which aspire to be general explanations of how people
make judgments. One explanation that has been advanced to explain
the dilution effect, conjunction fallacy, and latent scope bias is that
people make their judgments based on representativeness rather than
probabilities. Representativeness assumes that people judge the
strength of the evidence by calculating the similarity between the
judgment to make and the evidence presented. This has often been cast
as a feature matching process in which the features that are in common
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between the target and the judgment to make count in favor, while the
features that are distinctive between the target and the judgment to
make count against. For the dilution effect juror example above, the
diagnostic information that the man was known to argue with his aunt
and had no alibi increases the similarity of the man to the judgment of
guilt, while the non-diagnostic information that the man is of average
height and has average vision are distinctive from the features com-
monly associated with a murderer, and thus reduce the similarity be-
tween the man and the judgment of guilt. Therefore, representativeness
predicts a dilution effect Kahneman and Tversky (1972), Nisbett et al.
(1981), Zukier (1982).
A second explanation, proposed for both the dilution effect and
conjunction fallacy, is that people use an averaging rule instead of the
correct combination rule when making a judgment. For the dilution
effect juror example, averaging the strength of the diagnostic evidence
(e.g., arguing with his aunt and having no alibi) with the strength of the
non-diagnostic evidence (e.g., average height and vision) produces a
lower average strength compared to the diagnostic evidence alone, and
thus produces a dilution effect Anderson (1967, 1981).
Other explanations have been advanced to explain just the dilution
effect. One of these explanations is that participants are performing a
biased hypothesis test in which they count confirming evidence in favor
of a focal hypothesis and both non-diagnostic and disconfirming evi-
dence against the focal hypothesis Meyvis and Janiszewski (2002).
Applied to our example, the diagnostic evidence of the man arguing
with his aunt and having no alibi counts in favor of the focal hypothesis
of guilt, but the non-diagnostic evidence of being average height and
having average vision counts against the hypothesis of guilt, and so
produces a dilution effect. While experiments have shown that the di-
lution effect is complex and very likely has multiple causes, all of the
above hypothesized causes of the dilution effectively pin the blame on
the combination of non-diagnostic evidence with diagnostic evidence,
and indeed the name “dilution effect” does so as well. This leads to an
interesting question for the dilution effect, which in past work focused
on the differences between judgments of diagnostic evidence alone (D)
and judgments of diagnostic plus non-diagnostic evidence (D+ND). Is
the error in the D+ND judgments, leading to an underestimation of the
evidence relative to a normative standard as the name “dilution effect”
suggests? Or is it possible that the dilution effect is instead caused by a
bias in judging the D evidence, leading to an overestimate of this evi-
dence rather than underestimate of the D+ND evidence?
Here we use a paradigm with objective evidence that allows us to
separately determine the accuracy of D and D+ND judgments. Using
objective evidence allows us to compare judgments against an objec-
tively correct answer, and thus to assess the overall accuracy of the
judgment for D evidence and the judgment for D+ND evidence, as well
as the difference between them. Most previous research on the dilution
effect has used subjective rather than objective evidence, which means
whilst the difference between D and D+ND evidence can be assessed,
the overall levels of each cannot. Examples have included using per-
sonality characteristics as evidence when predicting a student's future
grade point average Zukier (1982), or using a face morph as evidence
when judging which of the two real faces the morph resembles more
Hotaling et al. (2015).
The few studies that used objective evidence all used classic “book
bag and poker chip” tasks. In book bag and poker chip tasks, partici-
pants are informed of the proportion of poker chips of various colors in
each of two book bags and then are asked to judge the probability that a
sequence of poker chips came from one bag instead of the other.
However, the empirical evidence for the dilution effect in this task is
both mixed Troutman and Shanteau (1977), Labella and Koehler (2004)
and potentially confounded: participants might not weigh the evidence
presented early in a sequence the same as evidence presented later in a
sequence, so any dilution effect found could instead by due to primacy
or recency effects Wallsten (1976).
To avoid the difficulties of subjective evidence and sequential ef-
fects, we designed an objective task that presented evidence simulta-
neously, by breaking the two pieces of evidence into two separate
components: an ice cream flavor and a cone flavor. In our task, parti-
cipants were asked to judge whether a particular ice cream, particular
cone, or particular ice cream and cone was purchased from one of two
ice cream shops. To objectively assess the evidence provided by the ice
cream, cone, or ice cream cone, participants were shown what the two
shops had sold during that day (see Figure 1). The content of the shops
determined whether ice creams and cones were diagnostic or non-di-
agnostic. By presenting the ice cream and cone simultaneously, we
avoid any confounding because of sequential effects.
Below, we report a series of experiments using these stimuli. In
Experiments 1a, 1b, 2, and 3 we find that D+ND judgments are closer
to normative than D judgments. This surprising result is not anticipated
by any of the existing explanations of the dilution effect, or indeed by
the name “dilution effect” itself. Our main result was robust: it held for
different ways of presenting the background information, evidence, and
for both likelihood and probability response scales. We next introduce a
new explanation for the dilution effect, which is a modification of a
recently proposed explanation for the latent-scope bias: that partici-
pants notice that there is missing information in the D stimuli and
preferentially “fill in” this missing information in a biased fashion,
which generally results in an overestimate of the strength of the D
evidence. This new explanation of the dilution effect predicts a
Fig. 1. Example of the task (left) and key test stimuli (right) in Experiment 1a.
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manipulation for decreasing the size of the effect in certain situations,
which we experimentally verify in Experiment 4. Finally, we explore
how our findings can explain previous empirical puzzles involving the
dilution effect, discuss why multiple explanations are needed for the
dilution effect, consider how filling-in could make sense as a compu-
tational strategy, and conclude with the wider implications for parti-
cipants filling in missing information.
1. Experiments 1a and 1b: Combined ice cream cones in shops
We begin with two experiments (Experiment 1a and 1b) in which
participants were asked to respond on a likelihood ratio scale, which
can reduce the effect of response biases like conservatism compared
with using a probability scale Phillips and Edwards (1966). The correct
likelihood ratio was easy to calculate: it was the number of matching
stimuli in one shop divided by the number of matching stimuli in the
other shop. That is, there is a simple strategy for producing normative
responses using the likelihood scale because the correct answer can be
found just by counting the ice creams cones in each shop that match the
particular ice cream, cone, or ice cream and cone target. Experiment 1a
used a 2:1 evidence strength for diagnostic evidence, and Experiment
1b used a 3:1 evidence strength for diagnostic evidence.
1.1. Methods
1.1.1. Participants
Participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, and
were recruited at different times for the two evidence strength experi-
ments. We recruited 114 participants for Experiment 1a. The 104 (43
female, 60 male, 1 unreported) participants who finished this experi-
ment had a mean age of 34.7 (SD = 10.6). We recruited 105 partici-
pants for Experiment 1b. The 97 (40 female, 56 male, 1 unreported)
participants who finished this experiment had a mean age of 32.8 (SD
= 9.0). Participants in each experiment received $1 as payment on
completion of the experiment.
1.1.2. Materials
Participants were shown a pair of ice cream shops, labelled Shop A
and Shop B. Each shop consisted of a set of complete ice cream cones:
16 per shop in Experiment 1a and 25 per shop in Experiment 1b. In both
experiments, ice cream cones were composed of one of three flavors of
ice cream (vanilla, strawberry, and chocolate) and one of three flavors
of cone (plain, strawberry, and chocolate) though these flavors were
never referred to by name. One of the three flavors of ice cream and one
of the three flavors of cone provided diagnostic evidence for Shop A,
another flavor of each provided diagnostic evidence for Shop B, and the
third provided non-diagnostic evidence. In Experiment 1a, the count of
the three flavors of ice creams and three flavors of cones were 8:4:4 in
Shop A and 4:8:4 in Shop B. In Experiment 1b, these counts were 15:5:5
in Shop A and 5:15:5 in Shop B. The ice cream and cone flavors were
combined factorially such that the evidence provided by each ice cream
or cone flavor was independent of the other component. Thus, in
Experiment 1a each diagnostic ice cream or cone flavor provided 2:1
evidence, while in Experiment 1b each diagnostic ice cream or cone
flavor provided 3:1 evidence, whether they were alone or combined
with a non-diagnostic piece of evidence. If both ice cream and cone
flavors were diagnostic toward the same shop, then the combined evi-
dence was 4:1 in Experiment 1a and 9:1 in Experiment 1b. If both ice
cream and cone were diagnostic toward different shops, the combined
evidence was always 1:1. Flavors were randomly assigned to these roles
for each participant, with independent randomization for ice cream and
cone flavors. For each individual participant, the shop names and their
contents were constant throughout the experiment.
Participants made responses on a slider scale that ranged in equal
steps from 10 times more likely for Shop A to 10 times more likely for
Shop B. The current position of the slider was labelled “X times more
likely to be Shop A than B.” Responses could also go one final step
further in either direction which was labelled, “More than 10 times
more likely to be Shop A than B” or vice versa. The slider began each
trial in the middle of the scale labelled, “Equally likely to be Shop A and
B”. Once participants were satisfied with the position of the slider, they
pressed a button to submit their response. The scale was discretized to
one decimal point.
A mistake in the experimental code allowed participants to select
values such as “Shop A is 0.5 times more likely than Shop B” between
“Equally likely to be Shop A and B” and “Shop A is 1 times as more
likely than Shop B”, which is easy to misinterpret. We corrected for this
error by coding all responses between “Shop B is 1 times more likely
than Shop A” and “Shop A is 1 times as more likely than Shop B” as
responses stating that the shops were equally likely. This affected 3.2%
of responses across Experiments 1a and 1b. All of the analyses below on
the corrected responses were also run with the uncorrected responses,
and the overall conclusions were the same.
1.1.3. Procedure
In both experiments, participants were instructed that there were
two ice cream shops in town, Shop A and Shop B, and that each shop
sold three kinds of ice cream and three kinds of cones. The shop dis-
plays were described as a summary of what the owners of each ice
cream shop had sold that day. During the task participants were asked
to imagine that they were walking around town and had to figure out
whether a person had been to Shop A or Shop B based on what ice
cream, cone or ice cream cone they were holding. To prepare partici-
pants for the different types of stimuli, they were told that sometimes
they could see both the ice cream and the cone, and other times they
could see only the ice cream or only the cone. They were told to make
their judgement in terms of how much more likely it was that this
person went to one shop or the other.
After receiving instructions, participants were asked to judge the
likelihood ratio of 15 stimuli: each of the 3 cones and 3 ice creams
alone, and each of the 9 possible combinations of ice creams with cones.
Stimuli were presented in a new random order for each participant.
1.2. Results
Because the results of the two experiments were very similar, we
interleave their results here. To determine whether we had found a
dilution effect in our novel task, we first calculated a dilution score by
subtracting each D response from each D+ND response whenever the D
stimulus was the same between the two (e.g., subtracting the response
to a vanilla ice cream from the response to a vanilla ice cream on a plain
cone in Figure 1). This score was a difference in likelihood ratio re-
sponses, where a negative value indicated the dilution effect. Because
the scale was discretized, it was possible for participants to produce a
dilution score that was exactly correct, despite the potential impreci-
sion introduced by participants using a pointing device. The plot of
these scores in the left panel of Figure 2 shows that the correct score
was the most likely score, 43% in Experiment 1a and 25% in Experi-
ment 1b, but that errors tended in the direction of a dilution effect: the
D responses were more extreme than the D+ND responses. In Experi-
ment 1a 73% of errors were in the direction of the dilution effect, and in
Experiment 1b this percentage was 75%.
Throughout this paper, we assess the evidence using both null hy-
pothesis significance testing (e.g., t-tests) and Bayesian hypothesis tests.
For the Bayesian hypothesis tests, BF10 refers to the Jeffreys-Zellner-
Siow (JZS) Bayes factor in favor of the alternative hypothesis over the
null hypothesis using the BayesFactor R package default of =r 0.707 for
t-tests Rouder et al. (2009). A value of BF10 above 1 is evidence for the
alternative hypothesis, while a value below 1 is evidence for the null
hypothesis. The value of BF10 itself gives the evidence, but for ease of
interpretation values of 3, 10, and 100 have been respectively termed
substantial, strong, and decisive evidence for the alternative hypothesis,
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while values of 1/3, 1/10, and 1/100 have been respectively termed
substantial, strong, and decisive evidence for the null hypothesis
(e.g.,Wetzels et al. (2011)).
In Experiment 1a, we found evidence for a dilution effect as the
mean dilution score was below zero, =M 0.94, =SD 1.69,= <t p(103) 5.71, . 001, =BF 11312710 . The dilution effect was also
found in Experiment 1b, =M 1.38, =SD 2.20,= <t p(96) 6.20, . 001, =BF 78935310 .
We also compared the responses to D stimuli to the objective correct
answer and responses to the D+ND stimuli to the objective correct
answer. Following the hypothesis implicit in the name “dilution effect”,
we would expect the D+ND responses to be on average underestimated
and the D responses on average to be accurate. We found a different
result. In Figure 2, the D responses were overestimated to a greater
extent than the D+ND responses in both experiments. In Experiment 1a
the mean D response was higher than the normative value =M 3.36,=SD 2.23, = <t p(103) 6.23, . 001, = ×BF 1.1 1010 6, and the mean D
+ND response was also higher than the normative value =M 2.42,=SD 1.39, = =t p(103) 3.06, .003, =BF 8.6310 . In Experiment 1b the D
response mean was higher than the normative value =M 4.99,=SD 2.27, = <t p(103) 8.64, . 001, = ×BF 6.0 1010 10, and the D+ND
response mean was also higher than the normative value =M 3.60,=SD 1.87, = =t p(96) 3.19, .002, =BF 12.410 .
1.3. Discussion
Overall, we found a very reliable dilution effect in both experiments
for both levels of evidence, but we did not find that the D responses
were accurate while the D+ND responses were diluted. Instead we
found that the D responses were clearly overestimated, and the D+ND
responses were also overestimated but to a lesser extent.
These overestimates cannot be explained as the usual conservative
bias of participants using a likelihood response scale (e.g.,Phillips and
Edwards (1966)). If D+ND trials were actually judged accurately, a
conservative response bias would have brought the responses below the
normative standard of 2:1, while we found that they were above the
normative standard.
However, there is a potential confound in Experiments 1a and 1b.
The stock in each of the shops, as shown in Figure 1, were presented as
ice cream flavors combined with cone flavors, which matched the way
that the stimuli were presented when participants made D+ND judg-
ments. In contrast, the D evidence stimuli were presented differently
than the stimuli in the shops: only an ice cream alone or a cone alone
were presented. It could be that the D judgments were less accurate
because the task of evaluating the evidence was harder; unlike the D
+ND stimuli, the D stimuli forced participants to filter out the irrele-
vant aspect of the ice cream cone.
2. Experiment 2: Separate ice creams and cones in shops
In Experiment 2, we created a new display for the ice cream cones in
the Shops in order to control for the potential confound in Experiments
1a and 1b. Instead of presenting the ice cream and cone flavors com-
bined into ice cream cones, we separated out the ice creams sold during
the day from the cones sold during the day (see example of Shops C and
D in Figure 3). This display reverses the relative difficulty of evaluating
the D and D+ND evidence in Experiments 1a and 1b. In this experi-
ment it is easier to assess the D evidence than the D+ND evidence
because the D stimuli match how the stimuli were displayed in the
shops, while evaluating the D+ND evidence requires combining evi-
dence together.
2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Participants
We recruited 113 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk, and
102 completed the experiment (51 female, 49 male, and 2 unreported).
The average age was 34.4 (SD = 11.1). Participants were paid $1 upon
completion.
2.1.2. Materials
As in Experiment 1a, participants were shown a pair of ice cream
Fig. 2. Results of Experiments 1a and 1b. The means in the Dilution Score plot are equal to the means in the Diagnostic + Non-diagnostic plot minus the means in the
Diagnostic plot. Negative values of the dilution score indicate the dilution effect. The red (dark grey) horizontal lines show the normative response in each plot. The
blue (dark grey) circles indicate the means across participants, with the error bars showing the 95% confidence intervals of the means. The light grey regions within
each plot give Gaussian kernel density estimates (with bandwidth of 0.1) of the of the raw dilution scores and trial-by-trial responses pooled across participants, with
the width of each region normalized to its maximum value.
A.N. Sanborn, et al. Cognition 196 (2020) 104110
4
shops, labelled by letters, containing three flavors of ice cream and
three flavors of cone in a ratio of 6:3:3 in one shop and 3:6:3 in the
other shop. There were 12 examples of ice cream and 12 examples of
cones in each shop, arranged separately instead of combined, as shown
in Shops C and D of Figure 3. The types and amount of evidence and the
response scale used were the same as in Experiment 1a. We corrected
for the programming error in the scale in the same way it was corrected
for in Experiments 1a and 1b, and this affected 7.3% of responses.
2.1.3. Procedure
Participants received the same instructions as in Experiments 1a and
1b, with the additional instruction to emphasize the independence of
how the ice creams and cones were combined, “The owners of the shops
did not tell you which ice creams were sold with which cones. However
they did say that people choose ice creams and cones independently:
their choice of ice cream will tell you nothing about their choice of
cone.” As in Experiments 1a and 1b, participants judged all of the 15
possible stimuli.
2.2. Results
As in Experiments 1a and 1b, we calculated a dilution score for each
pair of D and D+ND responses, by subtracting the D response from the
D+ND response. This score was a difference in likelihood ratio re-
sponses, where a negative value indicated the dilution effect. Figure 4
shows the distribution of these individual dilution scores. While the
correct score was most likely, representing 27% of all scores, 66% of
errors showed the dilution effect. Using the mean score for each par-
ticipant, we found evidence for a dilution effect as the dilution score
was reliably below zero =M 0.44, =SD 0.98,= <t p(101) 4.51, . 001, =BF 91910 .
The D+ND stimuli appeared to be more difficult in this experiment
than in Experiments 1a and 1b, but we found the same qualitative re-
sult: D+ND responses were overestimated less than D responses. The
overall mean response was closer to normative for the D+ND re-
sponses, as can be seen in Figure 4. Both responses were on average
above the normative value: the mean D response was higher than the
normative value =M 3.31, =SD 1.96, = <t p(101) 6.77, . 001,= ×BF 1.1 1010 7, as was the mean D+ND response =M 2.87, =SD 1.89,= <t p(101) 4.66, . 001, =BF 163910 .
2.3. Discussion
In this experiment, we again found that participants showed a di-
lution effect, but that the D+ND evidence was not diluted. Instead the
dilution effect occurred because the D evidence was very much over-
estimated, and the D+ND evidence was overestimated to a lesser ex-
tent. In this experiment, the D+ND evidence was clearly harder to
evaluate than it was in Experiments 1a and 1b, and participants made
more errors as a result. Despite the ease of computing the correct D
evidence (i.e., counting the number of matching stimuli in each shop,
and taking the ratio), these responses remained on average further from
the normative response.
Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2 both used a likelihood ratio scale, which
we chose because a simple counting strategy will generate the norma-
tive response on this scale. However, as we assessed participant accu-
racy against the scale used, our conclusions in these experiments de-
pend on participants using the scale correctly. To strengthen our
conclusions, it is important to replicate our results using a different
response scale.
3. Experiment 3: Responding on a probability scale
In order to determine whether participants in Experiments 1a, 1b,
and 2 really were more accurate at evaluating D+ND evidence, or if
they are misusing the likelihood ratio scale, we reran Experiment 2
using a different scale: the scale of probabilities. Probability scales have
been found to be used correctly in reasoning tasks Fernbach et al.
(2010, 2011), Meder et al. (2014), Meder and Mayrhofer (2017) and
finding similar results with this scale would strengthen the claim that
the dilution effect is not the result of dilution of D+ND evidence.
3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Participants
We recruited 110 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk, and
105 completed the experiment (60 male, 44 female, and 1 unreported).
The average age was 35.2 (SD = 10.7). Participants were paid $1.50
upon completion of the experiment.
3.1.2. Materials
As in Experiment 2, participants were shown a single pair of ice
cream shops, labelled Shop A and Shop B, containing three flavors of ice
cream and three flavors of cone in a ratio of 6:3:3 in Shop A and 3:6:3 in
Shop B. There were 12 examples of ice cream and 12 examples of cones
in each shop, arranged separately instead of combined, as shown in
Figure 3. The types and amount of evidence were the same as in Ex-
periment 2.
Participants made responses on a probability scale that ranged from
zero to one. The current position of the slider was labelled “From Shop
A with a probability of X and from Shop B with a probability of Y .”
where Y was equal to X1 . If the slider was moved to the extremes of
the scale, the label was, “From Shop A with a probability of 1.” or ‘From
Shop B with a probability of 1.” The slider began each trial in the
middle of the scale labelled, “Equally probable to be Shop A and B”.
Once participants were satisfied with the position of the slider, they
Fig. 3. Example of pairs of shops shown to participants in Experiments 2 and 3 in which the ice creams were separated from the cones.
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pressed a button to submit their response. The scale was discretized to
two decimal points.
3.1.3. Procedure
Participants received similar instructions as in Experiment 2, except
they did not receive any instructions to emphasize the independence of
how the ice creams and cones were combined. In this experiment,
participants responded to 36 stimuli. Each possible D stimulus was re-
peated 3 times for a total of 12 trials, with an additional 6 trials col-
lecting ND responses. The remaining 18 responses were made to each
possible combination of flavors repeated twice each.
The data reported here are from a larger between-participant ex-
periment that tested the effect of alignment of evidence (i.e., separating
the ice cream cones so that the ice cream appeared next to the cone),
and the way in which the shops and evidence were presented (i.e.,
presenting all of the information as text rather than as pictures). Here
we report the responses of participants in the condition that matched
those in Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2.
3.2. Results
As in the experiments above, we calculated a dilution score for each
pair of D and D+ND responses, by subtracting the D response from the
D+ND response. This score was a difference in probability responses,
where a negative value indicated the dilution effect. Figure 5 shows the
distribution of these individual dilution scores. While the correct score
was most likely, representing 10% of all scores, 78% of errors showed
the dilution effect. Using the mean score for each participant, we found
evidence for a dilution effect as the dilution score was reliably below
zero =M 0.065, =SD 0.069, = <t p(104) 9.64, . 001,= ×BF 1.5 1010 13.
Exactly correct responses (i.e., 2/3) were not possible in this ex-
periment, because the response scale was discretized to two decimal
points, but the percentage of D+ND responses above the target value
was 53% which was very close to half. The mean D+ND response was
very close to and not reliably distinguishable from the normative value
of 2/3, =M 0.66, =SD 0.072, = =t p(104) 0.77, .44, and indeed the
Bayes factor showed substantial evidence for the mean being equal to
the normative value: =BF 0.14410 . In contrast, the D response were
clearly overestimated: =M 0.73, =SD 0.079, = <t p(104) 7.72, . 001,= ×BF 1.1 1010 9.
3.3. Discussion
In this experiment we used a probability scale for responses instead
of a likelihood ratio scale, again finding a dilution effect without di-
lution of the D+ND evidence. As in Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2, the
dilution effect in this experiment was driven by the overestimation of
the D evidence, while the D+ND evidence was on average evaluated
more accurately. However, unlike in Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2 which
used a likelihood ratio response scale, in this experiment which used a
probability scale, participants estimated the D+ND evidence accurately
on average.
Extant explanations of the dilution effect do not predict the results
from Experiments 1-3. Averaging does not predict our results because
averaging assumes that D responses will be unbiased and the D+ND
responses would be less than the normative value. Biased hypothesis
testing also does not anticipate these results, because it assumes that
participants assess each piece of diagnostic evidence as evidence for the
favored shop, and additional non-diagnostic evidence as evidence
against that shop. Assuming participants are using the scale correctly,
biased hypothesis testing should predict that D responses are unbiased,
and D+ND responses are underestimated.
Representativeness also does not anticipate these results.
Representativeness assumes that participants compare the similarity of
the D or D+ND evidence to each of the shops, translating these relative
measures of similarity into a response. Representativeness does not
make detailed quantitative predictions, so while it has been used to
explain the dilution effect, it does not predict whether the D+ND re-
sponses or the D responses will be biased. We also provide a more
formal investigation in the Appendix showing that a variety of as-
sumptions about similarity do not allow representativeness to match
the effects found here.
4. A new explanation for the dilution effect: filling in missing
information
Why would participants overestimate the D evidence, and not
Fig. 4. Results of Experiment 2. The means in the Dilution Score plot are equal to the means in the Diagnostic + Non-diagnostic plot minus the means in the
Diagnostic plot. Negative values of the dilution score indicate the dilution effect. The red (dark grey) horizontal lines show the normative response in each plot. The
blue (dark grey) circles indicate the means across participants, with the error bars showing the 95% confidence intervals of the means. The light grey regions within
each plot give Gaussian kernel density estimates (with bandwidth of 0.1) of the of the raw dilution scores and trial-by-trial responses pooled across participants, with
the width of each region normalized to its maximum value.
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underestimate the D+ND evidence? A possibility is that participants
are not considering the evidence provided by the ice cream separately
from the evidence provided by the cone, but instead are considering ice
cream cones as a whole, even when only one part of the ice cream cone
is visible. Participants may then be trying to “fill-in” the missing evi-
dence when given only a cone or only an ice cream, analogous to how
the brain fills in the blind spot in the retina (e.g.,Ramachandran
(1992)).
Recent research into the latent scope bias has claimed that it is also
the result of people filling in missing features. The latent scope bias
occurs when people judge an explanation with fewer unverified pre-
dictions as more likely than an explanation with more unverified pre-
dictions despite no difference in the diagnostic evidence. In our latent
scope bias example from the introduction, the broad-scope explanation
was that if the man had murdered his aunt there would be shell casings
on the floor and his customary mug of hot chocolate would have been
left on the table, and the narrow-scope explanation was that if the
second suspect had done it there would only be shell casings. Generally,
the unverified predictions are of events with a low base-rate probability
(e.g., customary mug of hot chocolate would have been left on the
table), but in this recent research a series of experiments showed that
the latent scope bias can be reversed by making the unverified pre-
dictions of events with high base rates (e.g., if we replaced “customary
mug of hot chocolate” with “customary shaker of salt”). The latent
scope bias was attributed to participants filling in the missing in-
formation according to the base rates of the background information,
and then making their judgment using the correct decision rule using
this filled-in information as if it were real information Johnson et al.
(2016).
We can apply this same explanation to the dilution effect, and filling
in from the background distribution can explain the dilution effect we
found in Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2. We call this filling-in in an unbiased
fashion, to discriminate it from a variant we introduce immediately
below. Let's say that a participant is given Shops C and D in Figure 3,
and is asked to make a judgment on the likelihood ratio scale about a
vanilla ice cream alone. If the missing cone is filled in as chocolate,
combined with the vanilla ice cream there would be 4:1 evidence in
favor of Shop C, because there are twice as many chocolate cones in
Shop C than in Shop D, and the vanilla ice cream also is twice as pre-
valent in Shop C: multiplying the 2:1 evidence from the chocolate cone
with the 2:1 evidence from the vanilla ice cream produces 4:1 evidence
for a vanilla ice cream on a chocolate cone. If the missing cone is filled
in as strawberry, combined with the vanilla ice cream there would be
1:1 evidence, because there are twice as many strawberry cones in Shop
D than in Shop C which cancels the evidence in favor of Shop C from the
vanilla ice cream. If the missing cone is filled in as plain, combined with
the vanilla ice cream there would be 2:1 evidence in favor of Shop C, as
the plain cone is non-diagnostic. Assuming the participant weights each
of these possibilities according to the relative frequency of each cone
flavor across both shops (24 in total: 9 chocolate, 9 strawberry, and 6
plain), the participant's response to a vanilla ice cream would then be
(# of chocolate cones in total/total # of cones) *(odds that a chocolate
cone with vanilla ice cream is in C vs. D) + (# of strawberry cones in
total/total # of cones) *(odds that a strawberry cone with vanilla ice
cream is in C vs. D) + (# of plain cones in total/total # of cones) *(odds
that a plain cone with vanilla ice cream is in C vs. D) = (9/24)(4:1) +
(9/24)(1:1) + (6/24)(2:1) = 2.375:1. In contrast, if the participant is
given a plain cone with vanilla ice cream, there are no missing features
to fill in, so the participant would just assess the visible stimulus and
provide the correct response of 2:1. The dilution effect is produced here
because the expected response to the vanilla ice cream (i.e., D stimulus)
is greater than the expected response to the plain cone with vanilla ice
cream (i.e., D+ND stimulus). The same explanation works in Experi-
ments 1a and 1b.
However, this filling-in mechanism does not generate a dilution
effect in Experiment 3, which uses a probability scale. We can simply
convert the likelihood ratios in the above example into probabilities,
where for likelihood ratio x y: the probability is +x x y/( ). This non-
linear transformation of the scale has important implications. If the
missing cone is filled in as chocolate, combined with a vanilla ice cream
the probability response would be 4/5. If the missing cone is filled in as
strawberry, combined with a vanilla ice cream the probability response
would be 1/2. If the missing cone is filled in as plain, combined with a
vanilla ice cream the probability response would be 2/3. So here the
response to the vanilla ice cream (i.e., D stimulus) would be (9/24)(4/
5) + (9/24)(1/2) + (6/24)(2/3) 0.65, while the response to the plain
Fig. 5. Results of Experiment 3. The means in the Dilution Score plot are equal to the means in the Diagnostic + Non-diagnostic plot minus the means in the
Diagnostic plot. Negative values of the dilution score indicate the dilution effect. The red (dark grey) horizontal lines show the normative response in each plot. The
blue (dark grey) circles indicate the means across participants, with the error bars showing the 95% confidence intervals of the means. The light grey regions within
each plot give Gaussian kernel density estimates (with bandwidth of 0.1) of the of the raw dilution scores and trial-by-trial responses pooled across participants, with
the width of each region normalized to its maximum value.
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cone plus vanilla ice cream (i.e., D+ND stimulus) would be 2/3.
Because the response produced for the D stimulus is less than the re-
sponse produced by the D+ND stimulus, filling in from the background
distribution predicts a slight anti-dilution effect in Experiment 3, which
mismatches the dilution effect observed in this experiment 1 .
An alternative is that people may be filling in information in a biased
fashion. We take as inspiration a close analogue to our task in work on
category-based induction. In these studies, participants were presented
with sets of shapes with different colors or patterns that were dis-
tributed amongst various boxes. Figure 6 shows stimuli similar to those
presented in Murphy and Ross (2010). Participants were told that the
set of shapes within each box were drawn by a different child, and were
then asked about one attribute given another attribute. For example, a
participant might be told that the drawing was striped and was then
asked what the shape of the drawing would be. The correct answer in
this task is to say that the most likely shape is a square, because across
the two sets of shapes, there are more striped squares than striped
circles.
However, in these category-based induction tasks participants
decided upon the missing feature using only the most likely category,
instead of looking at both categories. Most participants responded that
the most likely shape was a circle, reflecting a process in which parti-
cipants first identified the most likely set for striped shapes, Tony in
Figure 6, and then chose circle because most of Tony's striped shapes
were circles Murphy and Ross (1994, 2010).
If people are filling in the missing information using the most likely
category, this process might be a key component for explaining the
overestimation of the D evidence in all three of the above experiments.
When given the vanilla ice cream alone along with the shops in Figure
3, participants may first identify that Shop C is the most likely shop for
the vanilla ice cream. Then, looking only at Shop C, they fill in the
missing cone with the available flavors using the proportions in that
shop. As a result, the mean D response for the vanilla ice cream would
be (6/12)(4:1) + (3/12)(2:1) + (3/12)(1:1) = 2.75:1, which is higher
than the 2:1 evidence for D+ND stimuli, producing a dilution effect.
Biased filling-in will also produce a dilution effect in Experiment 3
using a probability scale: the predicted response for D is (6/12)(0.8) +
(3/12)(0.5)+ (3/12)(2/3) 0.69, which is slightly higher than the
predicted D+ND response of 2/3.
Both types of filling-in are new explanations for the dilution effect,
and both types of filling suggest a novel intervention for removing the
dilution effect: changing the diagnosticity of what can be used to fill in
for the missing feature. Thus, in Experiment 4, we evaluate how
changing the evidence available from the missing feature changes the D
responses. We investigate whether making the missing feature always
non-diagnostic removes the bias in the D responses, and thus reduces or
removes the dilution effect.
5. Experiment 4: Manipulating the missing evidence
In this experiment, we predict that participant judgments will be
influenced by what values are available to fill in for the missing in-
formation. If people are filling in missing attributes, in either a biased
or unbiased fashion, then their response bias should be reduced when
all of the possible values for the missing component are non-diagnostic.
Using a likelihood ratio scale, as in the majority of the experiments
above, let's assume a participant was asked to judge the relative like-
lihood of a vanilla ice cream coming from Shops E and F in Figure 7. If
either a chocolate or plain cone were substituted for the missing in-
formation, this does not change the likelihood ratio: both the chocolate
and plain cones are non-diagnostic. The mean response using Shops E
and F for filling in for D stimuli would be unbiased, (6/12)(2:1) + (6/
12)(2:1) = 2:1. This forms an interesting contrast with the prediction of
a bias in Shops C and D in the Standard condition, despite the two pairs
of shops having exactly the same composition of ice creams.
We can also create a pair of shops, Shops G and H, that should
strengthen the bias for the D stimuli, as all of the missing information is
diagnostic. If a participant were judging the relative likelihood of va-
nilla ice cream coming from Shops G and H, then two possible cone
flavors are always diagnostic. If the participant fills in the most likely
cone, chocolate, then the likelihood ratio will be overestimated: 4:1
rather than the correct 2:1. The mean D response from biased filling-in
will then be, (8/12)(4:1) + (4/12)(1:1) = 3:1, which is slightly larger
than the predicted mean response of 2.75:1 for Shops C and D in the
Standard condition.
5.1. Methods
5.1.1. Participants
We recruited 102 participants for this experiment from the
University of Warwick community, and 98 participants completed the
experiment (81 female and 17 male, with age =M 18.8 and =SD 3.3).
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three counterbalance
groups that determined which pair of shops they saw first. There were
33 participants who saw the Diagnostic Missing Information condition
first, 27 participants who saw the Non-diagnostic Missing Information
Fig. 6. Example of stimuli used in category-based induction experiments. Each box contains a set of shapes drawn by one of two (fictional) people.
1 Taking the weighted average of the evidence along the response scale used
in each experiment can be justified by assuming participants believe that they
will be evaluated on their squared error along their response scale, as this
weighted average minimizes that squared error. As a reviewer suggested, we
could instead assume participants always take a weighted average on the
probability scale, no matter the scale given in the experiment, as this results in
answers that are closer to the correct ones. However, this alternative assump-
tion would result in a worse match between unbiased filling-in and the em-
pirical data.
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condition first participants, and 38 participants who saw the Standard
condition first.
5.1.2. Materials
Participants were given three different types of shop pairs in the
experiment. All shop pairs contained 12 examples of ice creams and 12
examples of cones, arranged separately, as in Experiment 2. One type of
shop pair, termed Standard, had the same structure as all of the shop
pairs in Experiment 2 as exemplified by Shops C and D in Figure 3. For
both ice creams and cones, there was one flavor that had 2:1 diagnostic
evidence for one shop, another flavor with 2:1 diagnostic evidence for
the other shop, and the third flavor was non-diagnostic. There were 15
possible test stimuli for this shop pair: 6 ice creams or cones alone, and
9 combinations of ice cream and cone.
The second shop pair, termed Non-diagnostic Missing Information
with an example given by Shops E and F in Figure 7 did not have the
same symmetry as in the Standard pair. While one component, either
cone or ice cream had the same 6:3:3 and 3:6:3 ratios in the two shops,
the other component was always non-diagnostic, having the ratios 6:6
and 6:6 in the two shops. This means that for D stimuli, the missing
information is always non-diagnostic in this condition. There were 11
possible test stimuli for this shop pair: 5 ice creams or cones alone, and
6 combinations of ice cream and cone.
The third shop pair, termed Diagnostic Missing Information, did not
contain any non-diagnostic evidence, as exemplified by Shops G and H
in Figure 7. Instead, both ice creams and cones always gave diagnostic
evidence at the 2:1 level. This means that for D stimuli, the missing
information is always diagnostic in this condition. The ratios of ice
creams and cones were always 2:1 for one shop, and 1:2 for the other
shop. There were 8 possible test stimuli for this shop pair: 4 ice creams
or cones alone, and 4 combinations of ice cream and cone.
The response scale used was the same as in Experiments 1a, 1b, and
2. We corrected for the programming error in the scale in the same way
it was corrected for in the earlier experiments, which affected 6.0% of
responses in this experiment.
5.1.3. Procedure
Participants saw all three conditions twice each, with the order of
conditions randomized so that participants saw all three conditions
before they repeated a condition. Within a condition, participants saw a
pair of shops that fit that condition, and made judgments about all
possible ice creams and cones alone and all possible pairs of ice creams
and cones that could arise from that pair of shops. As a result, there
were different numbers of trials in each block: 15 trials for a block in
the Standard condition, 11 trials for a block in the Non-diagnostic
Missing Information condition, and 8 trials for a block in the Diagnostic
Missing Information condition.
The instructions were similar to those used in Experiments 1a, 1b,
and 2. Between pairs of shops, participants were told that they were
“moving on to a new town” and that in that new town they would make
the same kinds of judgments but the shops would be different and have
different names. Also to encourage participants to treat the ice cream
and cones in the shops as being selected independently, they were told,
“People like to mix and match ice cream and cones, and buy every
combination of ice cream and cones.”
5.2. Results
5.2.1. Results of the first block
We first report the results of the first pair of shops seen by partici-
pants, because we found that responses changed after the first block. As
in the experiments above, we calculated a dilution score for each pair of
D and D+ND responses, by subtracting the D response from the D+ND
response. This score was a difference in likelihood ratio responses,
Fig. 7. Example of pairs of shops shown to participants in Experiment 4. Shops C and D are an example of a pair of shops shown in the “Standard” condition, in which
the missing information for Diagnostic stimuli can be of any type. Shops E and F are an example of a pair of shops shown in the “Non-diagnostic Missing Information”
condition, in which the missing information for Diagnostic stimuli is always non-diagnostic. Shops G and H are an example of a pair of shops shown in the “Diagnostic
Missing Information” condition, in which the missing information for Diagnostic stimuli is always diagnostic.
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where a negative value indicated the dilution effect. Figure 8 shows
these individual dilution scores. Note that this can only be done for the
Non-diagnostic Missing Information and the Standard conditions, be-
cause the Diagnostic Missing Information condition did not have any D
+ND responses that could be used to calculate dilution scores. All tests
of mean differences in responses between participants were performed
with Welch's unequal variances t-test, as this test is robust to differences
in standard deviation or sample sizes.
We found reliably less dilution in the Non-Diagnostic Missing
Information condition compared to the Standard condition,= =t p(52.1) 2.97, .004, =BF 10.810 (means and standard deviations
reported below). This difference between the Non-diagnostic Missing
Information and Standard conditions was due to differences in the D
responses because these differed between conditions,= =t p(57.9) 3.12, .003, =BF 6.610 , while there was no difference in
the D+ND responses, = =t p(49.9) 0.12, .91, =BF 0.2610 . The D re-
sponses also differed between the Non-diagnostic Missing Information
and Diagnostic Missing Information conditions,= =t p(54.0) 2.66, .010, =BF 3.610 , though they did not differ be-
tween the Standard and Diagnostic Missing Information conditions,= =t p(68.9) 0.58, .567, =BF 0.2810 .
Looking at the individual conditions in more detail, in the Standard
condition, the correct score was most likely, representing 34% of all
scores, and of the errors, 77% showed the dilution effect. Using the
mean score for each participant, we found evidence for a dilution effect
as the dilution score was reliably below zero, = =M 0.70, SD 1.28,
Fig. 8. Results of Experiment 4. The upper row of plots presents data from the first block of the experiment, and the bottom row presents the data aggregated over the
remaining blocks. The means in the Dilution Score plot are equal to the means in the Diagnostic + Non-diagnostic plot minus the means in the Diagnostic plot.
Negative values of the dilution score indicate the dilution effect. Along the horizontal axis of each plot are the condition labels, with the shops from Figure 7 relevant
to that condition in parentheses. The red (dark grey) horizontal lines show the normative response in each plot. The blue (dark grey) circles indicate the means across
participants, with the error bars showing the 95% confidence intervals of the means. The light grey regions within each plot give Gaussian kernel density estimates
(with bandwidth of 0.1) of the of the raw dilution scores and trial-by-trial responses pooled across participants, with the width of each region normalized to its
maximum value.
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= =t p(37) 3.37, .002, =BF 18.610 . D responses in the Standard con-
dition were correct on 57% of trials, and participants reliably over-
estimated the evidence, = = = =M t p2.95, SD 1.80, (37) 3.26, .002,=BF 14.210 . The D+ND responses in the Standard condition were
correct on 30% of trials, and were not reliably different from the nor-
mative response, = = = =M t p2.25, SD 1.07, (37) 1.44, .16,=BF 0.4510 .
By contrast the dilution errors in the Non-diagnostic Missing
Information condition were more balanced: the correct score was again
most likely, representing 46% of all scores, and of the errors 59%
showed the dilution effect. Using the mean score for each participant,
we found no evidence for a dilution effect as the mean dilution score
was actually above zero, = =M 0.33, SD 1.43, = =t p(26) 1.18, .25,=BF 0.3810 . D responses in the Non-diagnostic Missing Information
condition were correct on 61% of trials, and participants did not
overestimate the evidence, = = = =M t p1.89, SD 0.91, (26) 0.63, .53,=BF 0.2410 . The D+ND responses in the Non-diagnostic Missing
Information condition were correct on 39% of trials, and were also not
overestimates of the evidence, = =M 2.21, SD= =t p1.27, (26) 0.88, .39, =BF 0.2910 .
It was not possible to calculate dilution scores in the Diagnostic
Missing Information condition because no D+ND responses were pos-
sible. This condition was used as a control to check whether any effects
found in the Non-diagnostic Missing Information condition were due
only to using two flavors instead of three. D responses in the Non-di-
agnostic Missing Information condition were correct on 48% of trials.
Unlike in the Non-diagnostic Missing Information condition, partici-
pants did overestimate the evidence in this condition,= = = =M t p2.72, SD 1.50, (32) 2.78, .009, =BF 4.7510 .
5.2.2. Results of later blocks
Unlike in our previous experiments, in this experiment participants
experienced multiple conditions. We found that the dilution scores in-
creased for the Non-diagnostic Missing Information condition in later
blocks2, as shown in Figure 8, = =t p(34.2) 2.84, .008, =BF 35.710 . This
appears due to an increase in the D responses, = =t p(63.8) 3.14, .003,=BF 5.7310 , as the D+ND responses did not increase,= =t p(43.9) 0.42, .68, =BF 0.2510 , in this condition. In contrast, the
dilution scores in the Standard condition did not reliably change be-
tween the first and later blocks, = =t p(52.3) 1.16, .25, =BF 0.4610 .
However, both the D, = =t p(48.5) 2.35, .022, =BF 5.1210 , and D+ND
responses, = =t p(70.1) 2.24, .029, =BF 2.2310 , appeared to shift lower
in the Standard condition after the first block.
Comparing the dilution effect in the Non-diagnostic Missing
Information condition the second time this condition was experienced,
we also found that participants who experienced this condition in their
first block showed a reduced dilution effect compared to participants
who experienced another condition in their first block,= =t p(83.0) 2.02, .046, =BF 0.6910 , but as the t-test and Bayes factor
disagree on the direction of the effect, the evidence is weak.
Unlike in the first block, in the remaining blocks we found no dif-
ference in the dilution scores in the Non-Diagnostic Missing Information
condition compared to the Standard condition,= =t p(193.8) 0.46, .65, =BF 0.1710 . There was also no reliable dif-
ference between conditions in the D responses, = =t p(193.0) 0.64, .52,=BF 0.1910 or the D+ND responses, = =t p(191.1) 1.09, .29,=BF 0.2710 . Additionally there were no reliable difference in D re-
sponses between the Non-diagnostic Missing Information and
Diagnostic Missing Information conditions, = =t p(193.1) 0.619, .537,
=BF 0.1910 , or between the Standard and Diagnostic Missing
Information conditions, = =t p(194.0) 1.30, .194, =BF 0.3410 .
Looking at the individual conditions in more detail, in the Standard
condition the dilution score was reliably below zero= =M 0.49, SD 0.85, = <t p(97) 5.67, . 001, =BF 8713610 . D re-
sponses were reliably overestimated compared to the normative re-
sponse, = = = = =M t p2.32, SD 1.05, (97) 2.98, .003, BF 7.110 . The D
+ND responses were not reliably different from the normative re-
sponse, = = = =M t p1.83, SD 0.93, (97) 1.84, .07, =BF 0.5610 . The
Non-diagnostic Missing Information now showed a reliable dilution
effect, = =M 0.43, SD 0.82, = < =t p(97) 5.21, . 001, BF 1320210 . D
responses in the Non-diagnostic Missing Information condition were
now reliably above the normative value,= = = <M t p2.41, SD 1.13, (97) 3.64, . 001, =BF 47.510 . The D+ND
responses however were still not reliably different from the normative
response, = = = = =M t p1.98, SD 1.05, (97) 0.18, .86, BF 0.1110 . In
the Diagnostic Missing Information condition, participants did again
overestimate the D evidence, = =M 2.51, SD= <t p1.05, (97) 4.81, . 001, =BF 275410 .
5.3. Discussion
In the first block of this experiment, we saw the effect we expected
assuming participants were filling in the missing information. In both
the Standard and Diagnostic Missing Information conditions, the most
likely shops contained a plurality of diagnostic flavors for the missing
attribute and D evidence was greatly overestimated. In the Non-diag-
nostic Missing Information condition, the flavors of the missing attri-
bute for the most likely shop were all non-diagnostic, and there was no
dilution effect in this condition. This experiment strengthens the qua-
litative evidence for filling-in because it does not require participants to
have used the scale correctly: participants overstating their evaluation
of each piece of evidence (i.e., shifting their responses in each condition
the same amount) could explain the results in Experiments 1-3, but not
in this experiment. In addition, this experiment shows a reliable effect
of the distribution of evidence in the missing feature on the responses to
D stimuli. One alternative explanation is that participants may realize
that the missing feature in the Non-diagnostic Missing Information
condition is non-informative, and therefore not fill it in, and while we
cannot exclude this possibility, it would still implicate filling-in as the
source of the dilution effect.
Once participants had participated in the other conditions however,
the Non-diagnostic Missing Information condition was no longer ef-
fective in removing the dilution effect, and the D responses were the
same as in the Standard condition. The lack of difference between
conditions is interesting. It could be that the bias away from the nor-
mative responses were still mainly due to filling in the missing in-
formation, and that participants were reusing the D responses across
blocks. In particular, participants may have seen that the evidence fa-
vored one shop over the other and rather than recalculate their re-
sponse, they just reused the response they made to similar questions in
a previous block. Indeed, participants who saw the Non-diagnostic
Missing Information condition first showed a smaller dilution effect
when this condition came up a second time than participants who saw
another condition first, though this effect was weak. This kind of
computation-saving strategy has been called amortized inference
Gershman and Goodman (2014) and could potentially explain the dif-
ferences between responses in our first and later blocks.
6. General discussion
Across a series of experiments, we found that participants did show
a dilution effect for simple objective stimuli. Surprisingly, however, we
found that in most conditions participants were more accurate when
making judgments of D+ND evidence than they were when judging D
evidence alone. This observation goes against the very name of the
2 To compare statistically across blocks, we divided participants into those
who saw a particular condition in their first block and those who did not and
performed a between-participants comparison. For participants who did not
have a particular condition in their first block, we aggregated responses over
the two repetitions of the block. In Figure 8 we show all the data.
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dilution effect: instead of ND evidence diluting D evidence, it appears
that participants had trouble judging D evidence on its own. The result
was reliably found for different evidence strengths, held even when it
was more difficult to assess the D+ND evidence than the D evidence
alone, and occurred with both likelihood ratio and probability response
scales. These results were not anticipated by past explanations of the
dilution effect including representativeness Kahneman and Tversky
(1972), Nisbett et al. (1981), averaging Anderson (1967), Shanteau
(1975), or biased hypothesis testing Meyvis and Janiszewski (2002).
We proposed a new explanation for the dilution effect: participants
see the D evidence as having a missing feature and filling in that
missing feature using the information available in the most likely hy-
pothesis, which causes an overestimate of the D evidence. filling-in has
been used to explain the latent scope bias in past work Johnson et al.
(2016), assuming that participants fill in missing information using the
background distribution of possibilities. We modified this hypothesis to
explain the dilution effect, proposing that assumes participants fill in
the missing information using the most likely hypothesis, similar to that
which has been found in category-based induction Murphy and Ross
(1994, 2010). This biased filling-in process could explain the dilution
effect observed in Experiment 3, which used a probability scale, as well
as in the other experiments. We found further support for biased filling-
in in a quantitative model comparison reported in the Supplementary
Material.
The filling-in hypothesis also allowed us to identify a novel ma-
nipulation for eliminating the dilution effect: making the values avail-
able to fill in for the missing information entirely non-diagnostic. We
found that, at least initially, this made the dilution effect disappear as
the mean D response became very close to the normative response.
In the below discussion, we explore what kinds of dilution effects
the filling-in hypothesis can explain, what other kinds of dilution effects
it cannot explain, and hypothesize about what would drive participants
to use biased filling-in as a judgment strategy.
6.1. Dilution effects that filling-in can explain
Filling-in can potentially explain how various manipulations used
by other researchers affect the dilution effect. Filling-in requires more
steps to calculate than the correct answer does, as we argue below,
which may explain why time pressure reduces the dilution effect for
audit decisions Glover (1997). In addition, if filling-in is a mis-
understanding of the task rather than a heuristic used to reduce effort,
then this may explain why the most expert participants show a reduc-
tion in the dilution effect Shelton (1999).
Filling-in may also explain one key piece of evidence Meyvis and
Janiszewski (2002) used to motivate biased hypothesis testing as an
explanation for the dilution effect. In their Experiment 2, they used not
just non-diagnostic evidence, but also weakly diagnostic evidence in
combination with diagnostic evidence (D+WD). While a dilution effect
was found as mean D responses were greater than mean D+ND re-
sponses, mean D responses were less than mean D+WD responses. This
result was key evidence against averaging, because averaging predicts
that D+WD responses would be less than D responses. However, this
result can potentially be explained by filling-in. If D+ND and D+WD
responses are estimated accurately, then D+WD will exceed D+ND, as
the empirical data show. If the only possibilities for the missing feature
are ND or WD, which for the subjective stimuli of Meyvis and
Janiszewski (2002) would require empirical work to verify, then filling
in using either ND or WD evidence would result in D responses that fell
between the two, replicating the empirical pattern.
Filling-in can perhaps explain the dilution effect found in the per-
ceptual data of Hotaling et al. (2015), which asked participants to judge
which of two real faces a face stimulus resembled more. The face sti-
muli in this experiment were morphs between the top halves of the two
real faces, morphs between the bottom halves of the two faces, or both.
When both were presented, this was done in two different ways: one in
which the two halves of the face were offset so they appeared “split”,
and one in which the two halves were aligned. Participants were not
given non-diagnostic evidence, but were instead given diagnostic evi-
dence of various strengths for each face, and the dependent variable
was participant accuracy rather than participant ratings of evidence
strength. The empirical result was that larger difference in evidence
strength led to a larger dilution effect.
A key difference between our task and that of Hotaling et al. (2015)
is that they assessed accuracy in a task in which it was more difficult to
know which face was the most likely source of each evidence, compared
to our task in which careful counting can perfectly determine the most
likely source of each piece of evidence. Whether filling-in can explain
the results depends on how participants are making their choice: se-
lecting the response probabilistically, or always selecting what they
consider to be the most likely response Acuna et al. (2015), Acerbi et al.
(2014), Drugowitsch et al. (2016), Sanborn and Beierholm (2016).
Filling-in could explain the overall dilution effect in this experiment
assuming that participants are constructing a subjective probability
distribution that each response is correct, and then making a response
according to those probabilities, a decision strategy called probability
matching. In that case, filling in the missing evidence using the most
likely face when only a half-face is shown would raise the subjective
probability of the face the participant considered more likely – it would
reduce the amount of probability matching that was done and hence
raise the accuracy of the half faces. However, if participants are not
probability matching, and instead are responding by always selecting
the stimulus they consider subjectively more likely, then filling-in
would raise confidence and but not change their decision, and the di-
lution effect would need a different explanation in this experiment. And
indeed, it will require detailed computational modelling to see if all of
the results could be matched by a biased filling-in account.
One key aspect of the ice cream cone stimuli used in all of our tasks
was that it was clear that there should be two pieces of evidence: a
single cone or a single ice cream signaled that there was missing evi-
dence. Many other kinds of stimuli do not have this clear signaling of
missing evidence, which becomes especially important when the dilu-
tion effect is obtained between-participants, by some participants jud-
ging D stimuli and others judging the D+ND stimuli. Between-parti-
cipant designs in which it is not obvious that there is missing evidence
constitute many of the experiments on the dilution effect, including
those asking for judgments or predictions about people Kemmelmeier
(2004, 2007, and those asking for consumers’ judgments of products
Igou and Bless (2005).
Despite this lack of clear signaling, it is possible that filling-in still
plays a role. Returning to the example from Zukier and Jennings (1984)
given at the beginning of this paper, mock jurors were more convinced
that a man had murdered his aunt with a handgun when they were told
diagnostic information, than when they were told the diagnostic in-
formation plus the non-diagnostic information that he was of average
height and had average vision. When imagining whether a person had
committed a murder, it seems reasonable to consider whether this
person is physically capable of the act. It may well be that participants
are filling in physical information about the man in a biased fashion:
imagining him as large and able to accurately aim a gun. Relative to
this, the non-diagnostic information of being of average height and
vision could make seem less capable and thus less likely to be guilty.
Congruent to this, Zukier and Jennings (1984) ran a third condition in
which the non-diagnostic information was replaced with atypical non-
diagnostic information, that the man was extremely tall and had very
good vision, and found that impressions of guilt in this condition did
not significantly differ from that when participants were given diag-
nostic information alone. If participants were filling in similar in-
formation for the missing physical attributes, this could explain why no
difference was found. Overall, filling could operate where there is
missing information that is potentially diagnostic.
A.N. Sanborn, et al. Cognition 196 (2020) 104110
12
6.2. Multiple causes of the dilution effect
While filling-in can explain some aspects of dilution effect, there are
other aspects of the dilution effect that seem to require a different ex-
planation. Much research in the dilution effect has manipulated exactly
what kind of non-diagnostic information is given to participants Fein
and Hilton (1992), Hilton and Fein (1989), Peters and Rothbart (2000).
Peters and Rothbart (2000) suggested that these results occur because
participants use non-diagnostic information to disambiguate diagnostic
information. For example, when making predictions about a person A's
criminal behavior, finding out “person A is an alcoholic” suggests a
range of bad outcomes, but it is not clear from that statement how
severe the alcoholism is. Non-diagnostic information that person A
manages a hardware store helps show that the alcoholism is not as bad
as it could be, providing useful indirect information that should reduce
the prediction of criminal behavior. This explanation supposes that
participants are correctly evaluating both D and D+ND evidence, but
the experimenter is making the incorrect assumption that the evidence
is independent. This normative form of evidence combination of course
needs no filling-in process to explain, though it is consistent with the
idea behind filling-in that participants are not using simple rules, but
are engaging in complex inference when making judgments in these
tasks.
While in the preceding section, we argued that at times people may
fill-in even in between-participant experiments, there may well be other
causes to the dilution effect found in these experiments. Many of these
experiments have investigated whether the dilution effect may be due
to Gricean conversational norms. The idea is that participants believe
that the experimenter would not give them irrelevant evidence because
people generally do not insert irrelevant evidence into conversations, so
the participants treat the non-diagnostic as diagnostic. This idea has
found support in some work Igou and Bless (2005), Igou (2007), though
other work has shown that a conversational bias produces no dilution
effect on its own Kemmelmeier (2007a,b). Instead, it seems that par-
ticipants need to be both convinced that the conversational bias does
not apply and be held accountable for their responses in order for the
dilution effect to disappear Tetlock et al. (1996).
6.3. Biased filling-in as a computational strategy
We explained the dilution effect in our experiments with a me-
chanism that fills in missing values in a biased fashion. The most in-
teresting aspect of filling-in is that it occurs at all. As we point out in the
introduction to Experiments 1a and 1b, there is a simple and correct
algorithm for implementing the normative model for D stimuli: count
the number of matching stimuli in each shop (e.g., x and y) and report
the ratio (e.g., x y/ ) on the likelihood ratio scale, or the relative fre-
quency ( +x x y/( ) on the probability scale. Compared to this normative
algorithm, the filling-in process requires additional processing steps for
D stimuli: first filling in the missing information, and next calculating
the answer for the more complex filled-in stimulus.
Because it involves additional steps to calculate compared to the
normative algorithm, filling-in does not save any time or effort on the
part of the participant. This contrasts filling-in with other common
explanations of reasoning biases like representativeness or biased hy-
pothesis testing, which assume that participants substitute an easier-to-
calculate answer for a difficult answer Kahneman and Tversky (1972),
or averaging, which assumes that participants are using a cognitively
simpler and more robust strategy Juslin et al. (2009). As filling-in in-
stead assumes that participants are going out of their way to make an
incorrect response, it suggests that it might be a useful strategy in other
tasks.
So why would filling-in be a useful strategy? We can look for in-
spiration to the statistics literature, where filling-in describes a set of
methods collectively known as imputation (for an overview, see Little
and Rubin (2014)). Imputation is the process of filling in missing values
in a data set and is often used in these situations. It can be particularly
useful when data are not missing at random, but instead missing due to
a known cause. For example, assuming the distribution of p-values
observed in journal articles is representative of the p-values obtained in
experiments would be a mistake because lower p-values are more likely
to result in publication. Methods such as trim-and-fill have been used to
correct for this bias by imputing the missing p-values Duval and
Tweedie (2000).
In everyday experience these kinds of selection biases are rife in the
information that people observe: people choose their news sources and
their friends, both of which are likely to result in biased information
about the world (e.g., Del Vicario et al. (2016)). Imputation, when done
properly, can help correct for these kinds of biases. Some laboratory
experiments have shown that people do use imputation to correct for
biased missing data when they themselves are the ones who choose
which data to observe Denrell et al. (2019), Elwin et al. (2007),
Henriksson et al. (2010). Filling-in is then perhaps useful as a default
strategy to correct for the biased missing data that results from moti-
vated sampling of information.
While filling-in may be a useful strategy, the imputed values in both
our experiments and the latent scope bias experiments are biased. In the
work on filling-in in the latent scope bias, errors in reasoning with
missing evidence occurred because participants were inferring the
missing evidence from the background base rates, rather than inferring
it from the hypotheses under consideration Johnson et al. (2016),
Johnston et al. (2017). In our experiments, participants appear to have
preferentially inferred the missing evidence from the hypothesis most
likely to have produced the observable evidence, in line with work on
category-based induction Murphy and Ross (2010). Perhaps these
biased values are used to save time or effort over generating better
imputations, as these works have hypothesized.
Of course even biased filling-in assumes is a rather complex process
which averages over the many possible ways of filling in the missing
evidence. This process is not necessarily what participants are doing. A
computationally simpler alternative, motivated by the idea that people
approximate complex inference through sampling Griffiths et al.
(2012), Sanborn et al. (2010), Sanborn and Chater (2016), is that
participants are implicitly sampling the value that is filled in rather
than averaging over all of the possibilities. That is, they are filling in a
single value for the missing feature, which is picked according to the
probability it could occur. Averaging over a number of different judg-
ments in which a single missing value is sampled will produce
equivalent predictions to the biased filling-in account we describe
above, and our above analyses do not discriminate between these
possibilities.
Looking at the distributions of individual responses however does
suggest that people are taking one sample (or a small number of sam-
ples) of the missing evidence: filling in with a single sample would
produce a “spiky” response distribution with spikes at each of the levels
of evidence that filling-in could produce. For example, in Experiment 2,
filling in with a single sample would produce responses of 1:1, 2:1 or
4:1. Of course this is not the only explanation of spiky response dis-
tributions – our justification for analyzing the mean responses was that
participants often round their responses. Determining the extent to
which people are sampling, rounding, or both will require careful work
to disentangle these processes.
6.4. Conclusion
Overall, it is quite likely that there are multiple causes of the dilu-
tion effect, each which may be more or less to blame for the effect
depending on the design of the experiment. Our contribution is to de-
monstrate that a completely different type of hypothesis, filling-in, is
also needed to account for the dilution effect. Unlike other explana-
tions, filling-in explains the dilution effect as a misestimation of the
diagnostic evidence alone, rather than a dilution of the diagnostic
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evidence by non-diagnostic evidence.
Experimentally, this work points to the need to be careful about
assuming where the error is when evaluating human cognition against
normative models. What experimenters consider to be the judgments
that are easy and unbiased may not necessarily be the case. Indeed,
there is the potential for filling-in to explain, at least in part, additional
decision making biases. For example, the effects of conservatism in
probability judgments, the conjunction and disjunction fallacies, and
the effect of subadditivity all require participants to judge both parts
and wholes, and the biases are demonstrations that the judgment of the
part is higher than it should be relative to the judgment of the whole.
While these effects have all been explained as a result of inappropriate
aggregation of evidence, filling-in may also be to blame.
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Appendix A. Appendix
In this Appendix, we explore the predictions of representativeness. While representativeness has often appealed to similarity as defined in
Tversky's contrast model Nisbett et al. (1981), Tversky (1977), our stimuli consisted of shops that displayed examples in different proportions,
pointing more naturally to similarity as conceptualized in exemplar models of categorization. We show here, that depending upon the assumptions
made, that for the predictions of the D and +D ND stimuli, representativeness will agree with either the normative model, the averaging model, or
look like indifference.
Exemplar similarity depends on the mismatch between features, which we assume to be zero for matching ice creams or matching cones, and
equal to d for any mismatches. Similarity also depends on the exponent r , which we assume to be equal to 1 because the features are separable.
Finally, similarity also depends on the generalization gradient, c, which in our example here is confounded with d, so in the below we assume =c 1
and just investigate d. There are two main ways in which similarity can be combined across features. The most common assumption is that similarity
across features is multiplied, so the similarity between a stimulus and a single item in a shop is , where m is the number of mismatches. For
simplicity, we set =s e d in the below, where s0 1 is the decrement in similarity for one mismatch. To find the total similarity between an item
and a shop, the individual similarities between a stimulus and the shop items is summed Nosofsky (1986). Finally for a response on the likelihood
ratio scale, there is little in past research to guide us. We make the straightforward assumption that people take the ratio of similarities, and for a
response on a probability scale, we assume that people take the normalized ratio of similarities, as is assumed for categorization judgments.
For multiplicative similarity, the predicted similarity ratios between D and +D ND stimuli and Shops A and B (SA and SB respectively) in
Experiment 1a is the same, no matter how similar one mismatch is
= ++ = ++S D SS D S ss ss( , )( , ) 8 84 12 2 21 3AB (1)++ = + ++ + = + ++ = ++S D SS D S s ss s s ss ss( ND, )( ND, ) 2 8 61 6 9 (1 3 )(2 2 )(1 3 ) 2 21 3AB 22 2 (2)
Depending on s, the predictions for D and +D ND stimuli range from the normative values of 2:1 if =s 0 to indifference of 1:1 if =s 1. For this
assumption of multiplicative exemplar similarity, representativeness can very between the normative model and indifference.
Alternatively, it could be that participants are using additive similarity. Additive similarity has been discredited in categorization experiments
because it does not allow exemplar models to match the representational flexibility of human behavior Nosofsky (1992), but it is possible that it
might used in Experiments 2-4 because the features are presented separately in the shops. If additive similarity is used, then predicted similarity
ratios between D and +D ND stimuli and Shops C and D (SC and SD respectively) in Experiment 2 are
= ++ = ++S D SS D S ss ss( , )( , ) 6 183 21 2 61 7CD (3)++ = ++ = ++S D SS D S s ss s ss( ND, )( ND, ) 9 156 18 3 52 6CD 22 (4)
Depending on s, like for multiplicative similarity, the predictions for D judgments range from the normative values of 2:1 if =s 0 to indifference
of 1:1 if =s 1. However, for additive similarity, the predictions for +D ND judgments are different, ranging from 1.5:1 if =s 0 to indifference of 1:1
if =s 1. Thus if <s 1, additive similarity predicts a dilution effect. For this assumption of additive exemplar similarity, representativeness can thus
vary between the averaging model and indifference.
None of the possibilities considered here for exemplar similarity predict that D stimuli are judged to be greater than the normative value of 2:1, as
observed in our empirical data. Additionally, none of the possibilities predict that judgments of D stimuli are influenced by what is displayed in a
shop for the missing feature, as shown in the first block of Experiment 4. However, we should be clear that we are investigating exemplar similarity
within a pure representativeness explanation, and not making claims about exemplar similarity more generally. Indeed, exemplar models have been
modified via a filling-in process similar for category labels to produce the results of category-based induction tasks Nosofsky (2015), and biased
filling-in with an exemplar model could likely account for our results as well.
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